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AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HAZARDOUS WASTES
Murray L. Weidenbaum
Every poll of citizen sentiment in the United States shows overwhelming
support for doing more to clean up the environment. One public opinion survey by

The New York Times and CBS News reported that 58 percent agreed with the
following statement:
Protecting the environment is so important that requirements
and standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental
improvements must be made regardless of cost.
With such an overwhelming public mandate and a plethora of new laws and
directives by the Environmental Protection Agency plus tens of billions of dollars
of compliance costs by private industry, why then are ecology groups and so many
citizens so unhappy with the results?
Unfortunately, environmental action is an important example of the failure
of the American society to follow through on good intentions. Those same citizens
who want environmental improvements "regardless of cost" are vociferously
adamant in opposing the location of a hazardous waste facility in their own
neighborhood. Nor are they too keen on paying for the cleanup. Sure, they are all
for cleaning up the environment, but why don't you put the dump site in someone
else's back yard? And why don't you get "them" (meaning the other fellow) to pay
for it?
Note:

This material is drawn from the author's forthcoming book, The Post
Reagan Economy (New York, Basic Books, 1988).
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A sad example is what happened when the enlightened citizens of Minnesota
received a $3.7 million grant from EPA to build and operate a state-of-the-art
chemical landfill which could handle hazardous wastes with high assurance of
safety. In each of the 16 locations that the state checked out, the local residents
raised such a fuss and howl, that the state government backed off. Ultimately, the
unspent grant was returned to EPA.
Unfortunately, the Minnesota experience is not an exceptional case. Since
1980, not a single major new disposal facility has been sited anywhere in the
United States.
This ambivalent attitude toward the environment is nothing new. In the
early 1970s, the National Wildlife Federation commissioned a national survey to
ascertain how much people were willing to pay for a cleaner environment. At a
time of peak enthusiasm for environmental regulation, the public was asked, "To
stop the pollution destroying our plant life and wildlife, would you be willing to
pay an increase in your monthly electric bill of $1 ?" The "no" vote won hands
down, 62% to 28% (with 10% "not sure"). That survey, we should recall, was taken
before the big runup in utility bills. Perhaps not too surprisingly, the survey
showed strong support for taxing business to finance environmental cleanup.
In other words, most Americans very much want a cleaner environment, but
they are neither willing to pay for it nor even seriously inconvenience themselves.
They try to take the easy way out -- by imposing the burden on "someone else,"
preferably large impersonal institutions. Meanwhile most of us remain totally
oblivious to the key role that we as consumers play in this process by continuing to
demand rising amounts of goods and services whose production and distribution
generate the great bulk of pollution. Let us try to see how the nation got into this
policy box and then examine some opportunities for solution.
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The Environment Policy Problem
The sad truth is that EPA frequently falls short in meeting congressionallymandated goals for pollution cleanup and the number of dangerous dump sites
filled with overflowing hazardous wastes continues to mount. A cynic might react
to the mountain of environmental impact statements and regulatory issuances that
are prepared each year with the plea, "Let us mourn for all the trees that are
needlessly cut down to meet the paperwork requirements of environmental
statutes."
It is too easy for environmental groups to respond to these serious ecological

problems by blaming them all on neanderthals in the business community who do
not care about the air we breathe, the water we drink, or the land we live on -and the EPA for knuckling under to their pressures. Nor is public policy helped
by the mirror image of that activity -- business executives accusing both EPA and
environmental groups of not caring a whit about such practical matters as jobs or
the economy.
The fact is that the status quo in hazardous waste policy is not working.
Congress continues to pass high-sounding legislation with unrealistic timetables and
inflexible deadlines, while EPA gets ever more responsibilities and private industry
spends billions more on environmental compliance. Meanwhile, serious ecological
problems worsen. In the words of former administrator Bill Ruckelshaus, "EPA's
statutory framework is less a coherent attack on a complex and integrated societal
problem than it is a series of petrified postures." Let us see if there are sensible
ways out of this policy quandary.
From my own experience, I am mindful of the fact that virtually any
change in an environmental statute proposed by an_economist is viewed as the
response of a green-eyeshade type devoid of all ecological concerns. Perhaps some
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modern-day Shakespeare can write the script whereby a reform-minded economist
convincingly declares, "If I am polluted, do I not cough?"
Let us turn to the current controversy over the disposal of hazardous wastes.
Instances of toxic-waste contamination at Love Canal in New York State and at
Times Beach here in Missouri have brought a great sense of urgency to the
problem. The public mood on the subject of hazardous waste leaves little room for
patience -- but much opportunity for emotional responses. The same holds true, to
a large extent, for the attitude of Congress.
Turning to dioxin, I feel obliged to note that the most severe reaction
reported so far by humans is a bad case of chloracne -- which is a severe, acne-like
skin reaction. The scare stories were typically based on extrapolating from data on
animal experiments, which is very tricky. For example, the lethal dose of the most
toxic dioxin (2, 3, 7, 8 TCDD) for hamsters is 5,000 times higher than that for
guinea pigs. Nevertheless, I readily confess my unwillingness to move to or even
visit Times Beach and our hearts must go out to those people who have suffered
such severe psychological and financial damage.
In trying to avoid the repetition of such situations, EPA has promulgated
detailed regulations on how polluters must keep track of hazardous wastes and how
they should dispose of them. Late last year Congress extended and expanded
Superfund, the program designed to clean up hazardous waste sites. The law will
require companies and ultimately consumers to pay in $9 billion to the fund over
the next five years. Despite all this effort and attention, the hazardous waste
dump problem is little improved over the situation that prevailed before Congress
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act in 1980. Let
us see what can be done to deal with this serious situation.
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Incentives for Locating Toxic Dumos
Let us face the main reason for the scarcity of hazardous-waste sites -- the
"Not in My Backyard" syndrome. Sites for toxic substance disposal have joined
prisons and mental hospitals as items that the public in general wants, but not too
close by.
The fact remains that continued public opposition to virtually every means
of disposing of toxic substances will inevitably lead to disrupting the manufacture
of needed products. Unfortunately, this could also lead to more illegal and
dangerous "midnight dumping" of chemicals wastes and other hazardous materials.
But the hazardous-waste-disposal problem is not going to disappear unless
Americans change to less polluting methods of production and consumption. Until
then, greater understanding is needed on the part of the public and a willingness
to come to grips with important features of the problems arising from the
production and use of hazardous substances. We need to look upon environmental
pollution not as a sinful act, but as an activity costly to society and susceptible to
economic incentives.
Dealing with important and continuing national problems inevitably
involves making hard choices. Of course, it will cost large amounts of money
(likely in the tens of billions of private and public expenditures in the next
decade) to meet the society's environmental expectations. But spending money may
be the easiest part of the problem. Getting people to accept dump sites in their
neighborhoods is much more difficult.
The answer surely is not an appeal merely to good citizenship, but to
common sense and self-interest. In a totalitarian society, people who do not want
to do something the government desires are simply f_orced to do so. In a free
society with a market economy, in striking contrast, we offer to pay people to get
them to do something they otherwise would not want to do. The clearest example
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in modern times is the successful elimination of the military draft coupled with
very substantial increases in pay and fringe benefits for voluntarily serving in the
armed forces.
We must recognize that citizens as individuals have much to gain by
opposing hazardous waste facilities that would be located near them. When we
stop to think about it, it is not fair for society as a whole to benefit from a new
safe disposal site, but to impose most of the costs (such as depressed property
value) on the people in the locality. But we also should realize that local resistance
to dealing with hazardous wastes imposes large costs on society as a whole. After
all, blocking new waste facilities does not make the problem disappear. To the
contrary, holding vast quantities of toxic substances in temporary and
deteriorating storage conditions is no solution.
But there is a way of reconciling individual interests and community
concerns. It is economic incentives. Just think about it. The prospect of jobs and
income for the community encourages many· communities to offer tax holidays and
other enticements to companies considering the location of a new factory -- which
often does not exactly improve the physical environment of the region. Under
present arrangements, however, there is little incentive for the citizens of an area
to agree to locating a site for hazardous wastes in their vicinity, no matter how
safe the facility really is. But perhaps some areas would accept such a facility if
the state government (financed by all of the citizens who will benefit from the
disposal facility) would pay for a new school building or firehouse or library or
some other important civic investment desired by the residents of the area adjacent
to the dump site. After all, unlike an industrial factory, a hazardous waste facility
provides few offsetting benefits to the local residents in the form of jobs or tax
revenues.
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This idea is not as far fetched as it may seem. An episode in 1985 shows
the promise of the incentive approach. In the rural town of Lisbon, Connecticut,
an entrepreneur proposed to locate a modern incinerator that would generate both
energy from waste and $1 million in tax revenues. Despite the financial incentive
and assurance that the incinerator would be equipped with the latest antipollution
devices, he was rebuffed. Then the businessman tried another tactic. Instead of
saying that the new facility would bring the town $1 million a year in additional
taxes, he promised to pay the property taxes of every landowner in the town for
the next 25 years. Actually, the total cost would be about the same. But
individual citizens could appreciate the direct benefits of the second approach.
Local opposition to the undertaking quickly diminished. A town
referendum on the incinerator yielded a vote of 680 in favor and 540 opposed. But
that vote was only advisory. Later on, the town Planning and Zoning Commission
voted 5 to 4 against the project. The incentive approach, in the case of Lisbon, can
be described as producing a near miss. Yet the incident does show the latent
citizen support for making difficult tradeoffs when provided with some reasonable
-- and in this case imaginative -- alternatives.
But there is no need to place the entire burden for improving the status quo
of environmental policy on private citizens. There is much that government can do
to improve the situation. For example, EPA could reduce the entire hazardous
waste problem process by distinguishing between truly lethal wastes -- which
clearly should be disposed of with great care -- and wastes that contain only trace
or minute amounts of some undesirable materials. To the extent that changes in
legislation would be required, the agency should urge Congress to make them.
Public policy needs to take account of the fact that levels of some
substances can now be measured by the EPA in terms of parts per quadrillion.
That means that many of the scare headlines about chemical health hazards are
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akin to searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack. Actually, the needlehaystack comparison is much too modest. One part per billion is just one inch in
16,000 miles, a second in 32 years, a penny in $10 million, or four drops of water
in an Olympic-sized pool.
A recent EPA report concludes that the agency's current priorities "do not
correspond well" with its rankings by risk of the various ecological problems that it
is dealing with. Thus, the agency's own study found several areas of high risk but
little regulatory effort. A key example is the runoff of polluted water from farms
and city streets.
Conversely, areas of "high EPA effort but relatively low risks" included
management of hazardous wastes, cleanup of chemical waste dumps, regulation of
underground storage tanks containing petroleum or other hazardous substances, and
municipal solid waste. The reason for this mismatch between needs and resources
is obvious. EPA's priorities are set by Congress and reflect public concerns more
than scientific knowledge.
The results of this mismatch are substantial. After all, not all hazards are
created equal. At present, it is likely that some disposal sites are being filled with
innocuous material while truly dangerous substances are, or will be -- for lack of
space-- dumped illegally or stored "temporarily." What is needed is more
widespread application of the legal concept known as de minimis non curant lex -the law does not concern itself with trifles.
Back in 1979, a federal circuit court supported the view that there is a de
minimis level of risk too small to affect human health adversely. That doctrine
was cited in turning down the claim that some "migration" of substances occurred
from food-packaging films and food-contact articles. More recently, in 1985, the
FDA concluded that using methylene chloride to extract caffeine from coffee
presented a de minimis risk. Hence, the substance is safe for its intended use.
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Just this past December, Professor Bruce Ames of the University of
California at Berkeley spoke out on this subject -- he is the inventor of the Ames
test, widely used to identify chemicals that might be carcinogens (i.e., cancer
causing). Here is a direct quote:
We do want rules about pollution, but I'm not sure we should
be spending enormous amounts of money getting that last part per
billion out of the water supply when there's really no evidence that
it is doing any harm ...
A Birth Control Approach to Pollution
Over 99 percent of federal and state environmental spending is devoted to
controlling pollution after waste is generated. Less than 1 percent is spent to
reduce the generation of waste. Moreover, many current pollution control methods
often do little more than move waste around. For example, air and water pollution
control devices typically generate solid, hazardous waste that goes to landfills and
often leach from there into groundwater.
Clearly, the most desirable approach is to reduce the generation of
hazardous wastes in the first place. Again, economists have developed some
concepts that are useful. The way to do that is to provide adequate incentives to
manufacturers to change their production processes to reduce the amount of wastes
created or to recycle them in a safe and productive manner. Further, to the extent
that hazardous ·w astes must be generated, government should make their proper
treatment or disposal a relatively easy matter rather than an extraordinarily
difficult one. Measured against these two objectives, the current legal framework
is not as good as it could be.
Under recent amendments to the federal "Superfund" law, clean ups are
financed with a combination of taxes levied on producers of chemical "feedstocks"
and petroleum, a surtax on the earnings of large manufacturing companies, and
contributions from the Treasury. Thousands of serious disposers who do not
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happen to be in the chemical or oil business wind up paying much less than
comparable disposers in those two targeted industries. Similarly, large
manufacturers may pay disproportionately more if they have high revenues and
low waste generation. The problem is that we now tax producers rather than
polluters. By doing that, we are missing a real opportunity to curb the actual
dumping of dangerous waste.
A basic correction is needed in that major piece of environmental
legislation called the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (or "Superfund"). Conceptually, switching to a waste-end fee levied
on the amount of hazardous-wastes that a company actually generates and disposes
of would be far more economically sound than taxing the amount of production.
(I) It would provide an incentive to reduce the actual output of waste. Some

companies would find it cheaper to change their production process than to pay
the tax. (2) It would promote development of recycling and reuse systems. (3) It
would cover the products produced overseas which are now disposed of in our
country tax free. In short, rewriting the Superfund law so that it is more fair
would also help protect the environment -- and would probably save money.
More companies are recycling as they become increasingly aware of the
business possibilities and the economic benefits. Let me give you a few examples.
One chemical firm burns 165,000 tons of coal a year at one of its textile fiber
factories. That generates 35,000 tons of waste in the form of flyash. The company
recently found a local cement-block company that was testing flyash as a
replacement for limestone in making lightweight cement blocks. The chemical
company now sells the flyash to the cement block manufacturer. What has been an
undesirable waste by-product

~as

been turned into a commercially useful material.

Simultaneously, the companies are conserving the supply of limestone.
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In another industry, a timber company through its research developed a new
use for tree bark. That is the last massive waste product of the wood products
industry. The firm designed a bark processor that made it the first domestic
producer of vegetable wax, an important ingredient in cosmetics and polishes. Yet
another case of constructive recycling is furnished by the manufacturing practices
of a chemical plant in Illinois. It had been creating a veritable sea of calcium
fluoride sludge (at the rate of 1,000 cubic yards a month) as a by-product of its
manufacture of fluorine-based chemicals. The company found that the sludge
could be mixed with another waste product to produce synthetic fluorspar, which
it had been buying from other sources. Recycling the two waste products now
saves the firm about $1 million a year.
Incentives to do more along these lines could be provided in several
different ways. The least desirable is to subsidize the producers to follow the
desired approach. In this period of large budget deficits, that would, of course,
increase the amount of money that the Treasury must borrow.
A more promising alternative is to put a stiff tax on the generation and
disposal of hazardous wastes. The object would not be to punish the polluters but
to get them to change their ways. If something becomes more expensive, business
firms have a natural desire to use less of the

item~

In this case, the production of

pollution (specifically, hazardous wastes) would become more expensive. Every
sensible firm would then try to reduce the amount of pollution tax it pays by
curbing its hazardous wastes. Care needs to be taken to make such a tax workable
and to guard against more "illegal dumping" by generators in an effort to avoid the
tax.
Adjusting to new taxes on pollution would not be a I?atter of patriotism but
of cost minimization and hence profit maximization. The pollution tax approach
appeals to self-interest in order to achieve the public interest. Many economists
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have long advocated "taxing" pollution through effluent fees as a more efficient
alternative to the current regulatory system. They argue that charging polluters
for the pollution they cause increases incentives for companies to find innovative
ways to decrease their discharges.
These fees would have the effect of raising costs and hence prices for
products whose production generates a lot of pollution. Consumer demand would
tend to shift to products which pollute less. In order to stay competitive, highpolluting producers would have to economize on pollution, just as they would on
any other costly factor of production. Since pollution imposes burdens on the
environment, it is only fair that the costs of cleaning up that pollution should be
reflected in the price of a product whose production generates this burden.
The Public Sector Drags Its Heels
A word of caution: we should avoid falling into a common trap -- that of
associating polluters exclusively with business. To be sure, many companies do
generate lots of toxic waste and not all of them handle it properly. But the same
can be said about government agencies, hospitals, schools and universities.
Moreover, EPA lacks the enforcement power over the public sector that it possesses
over the private sector. Reports of plant closings due to the high cost of meeting
environmental standards are common. The "lost opportunity" cost for the plant not
built, or the expansion not made, is probably higher still. In contrast, there is no
record of a government agency or even of a single government facility closing
down for the same reason.
It therefore is not surprising that the General Accounting Office says that

federal agency performance in carrying out the requirements of hazardous waste
disposal "has not been exemplary." In fact, a GAO report issued late last year says
that, of 72 federal facilities inspected, 33 were in violation of EPA requirements;
and 22 had been cited for Class 1 (serious) violations. Sixteen of the 33 facilities

.

.
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remained out of compliance for six months or more. Three had not been in
compliance for more than three years.
A major offender is the Department of Defense which now generates more
than 500,000 tons of hazardous waste a year. That is more than the five largest
chemical companies combined.
The federal government does not set a good example in terms of its
compliance with its own environmental directives. It expects the private sector to
take environmental concerns far more seriously than it does itself. The point is
not to let anyone off the hook. The preferred solution is quite obvious: what is
sauce for the goose should also be sauce for the gander.
Regulation Is a Consumer Issue
Let me return to my main theme. Environmental economics makes for
strange alliances. So far, business interests have opposed the suggestions of
economists for sweeping changes in the basic structure of government regulation
such as using taxes on pollution. After all, despite the shortcomings of the present
system of government regulation, many firms have paid the price of complying
with existing rules. Firms have learned to adjust to regulatory requirements and to
integrate existing regulatory procedures into their long-term planning.
In developing public support for regulatory reform, it is vital to distinguish
between the self-serving objective of merely reducing the burdens on business and
the enlightened attitude of adopting more efficient and more effective modes of
regulation. As long as regulatory changes are seen as primarily a problem for
business, there will be limited public support for the kinds of reform that I have
been advocating. I must admit that I share the public attitude that business
executives are paid to deal with difficult problems, including the ones that arise in
complying with regulation.
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But reforming regulation is truly a consumer issue. It is the consumer who
receives the benefits from regulation and who ultimately bears the burden of the
costs of compliance in the form of higher prices and less product variety. Thus it
is the consumer who has the key stake in improving the current environmental
regula tory morass.
At first blush, economics and ecology may seem to be poles apart. But when
we consider economic analysis to be a way of dealing with difficult problems of
choice -- rather than a mere green eyeshade approach -- we can see how using some
basic economic concepts can help to achieve our important environmental
objectives.

